The National Labor Relations Act Does Not Preempt a Discharged Permanent Replacement Worker\u27s State Cause of Action by Stromire, Stephanie L.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 37 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - October 1984 Article 5 
10-1984 
The National Labor Relations Act Does Not Preempt a Discharged 
Permanent Replacement Worker's State Cause of Action 
Stephanie L. Stromire 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephanie L. Stromire, The National Labor Relations Act Does Not Preempt a Discharged Permanent 
Replacement Worker's State Cause of Action, 37 Vanderbilt Law Review 1205 (1984) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
The National Labor Relations Act Does Not
Preempt a Discharged Permanent
Replacement Worker's State Cause of
Action
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 1205
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND ................................ 1207
A. The NLRA and the Common-Law Develop-
ment of a Federal Labor Preemption Doctrine 1207
1. The NLRB's Primary Jurisdiction: Con-
duct that the NLRA Protects or Prohibits 1209
2. Permitted Activities: Conduct that the
NLRA Does Not Regulate .............. 1213
B. The Employer's Right to Hire Permanent Re-
placement Workers ........................ 1215
1. Economic Strikes ....................... 1216
2. Unfair Labor Practice Strikes ........... 1219
3. Converted Strikes ...................... 1219
III. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale ........................... 1220
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF Belknap ........................ 1224
A. Federal Preemption ........................ 1224
B. Hiring Permanent Replacement Workers .... 1225
C. State Interpretations of "Permanent Employ-
m ent" ..... ............................... 1228
V. CONCLUSION ....................................... 1230
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
the Act)1 to provide a uniform national labor policy2 and to pro-
mote the free flow of interstate commerce by defining the rights of
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. Congress enacted the NLRA to avoid the "diversities and conflicts likely to result
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies." Garner v.
Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953). For a background of state activity in the
labor field before the NLRA, see Note, Union Trespass: Sears v. Carpenters and Labor Law
Preemption, 40 U. PriT. L. REv. 779, 779-80 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Union
Trespass].
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employees, employers, and labor organizations.3 The NLRA
authorizes the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the
Board) to implement and enforce the Act.4 Although the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution dictates that
the NLRA preempts conflicting state law,5 the Act leaves room for
the states to regulate some labor activity.6 Congress, however, has
not yet defined the states' role in the labor relations area.7 The
Supreme Court, on the other hand, has declared that the states'
powers "can be rendered progressively clear only through the
course of litigation."8 While this case law approach allowed the
Court to develop a preemption doctrine, the Court has not deter-
mined the extent of permissible state action under the NLRA.
3. The NLRA provides:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
4. According to the Act:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging
in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of this title) affecting commerce. This
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise.
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
5. The supremacy clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONsT. art VI, cl. 2.
The Supreme Court first addressed the federal preemption of state commerce law in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The Framers designed the constitutional
principles of preemption to avoid possible conflicts between official bodies having authority
to regulate the same subject matter. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1971).
6. The Supreme Court has refused to hold that federal law preempts all "local regula-
tion that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees,
employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States." Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971).
7. The Supreme Court recognized that the Act "leaves much to the states, though
Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indica-
tions of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible." Garner v.
Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
8. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955) (state court did not
have power under NLRA to enjoin union picketing). The Court noted in International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Gonzales 356 U.S. 617 (1958) that: "[t]he statutory implications concerning
what has been taken from the States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic na-
ture, to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation." Id. at 619.
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The Supreme Court recently reexamined the labor preemption
doctrine in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale.' Belknap raised the novel ques-
tion whether the NLRA preempts discharged permanent replace-
ment workers'1 ° state causes of action against their former em-
ployer for misrepresentation and breach of contract. The Belknap
decision highlights the Court's inadequate guidelines for analyzing
labor preemption questions and underscores the uncertainties sur-
rounding current labor decisions addressing the role of permanent
replacement workers.
The purpose of this Recent Development is to examine the is-
sues surrounding discharged permanent replacement workers and
to discuss problems confronting state courts that try to implement
the Belknap decision. Part II of this Recent Development analyzes
the legal background leading up to Belknap. Part III examines the
Belknap opinion. Part IV criticizes the decision on three fronts
and suggests possible ways of addressing the problems that Belk-
nap presents.
H. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The NLRA and the Common-Law Development of a Federal
Labor Preemption Doctrine
Most labor preemption cases consider whether the NLRA pro-
tects the activity in question under section 711 or prohibits the ac-
tivity under section 8.12 Section 7 grants employees the right to
9. 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983).
10. For the purposes of this Recent Development, a permanent replacement worker is
anyone who accepts an offer of employment with the expectation that the employment will
continue after the strike ends.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as author-
ized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id.
12. Casenote, Labor Law-New York Telephone Co. v. New York Department of La-
bor, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1005 (1980). The Supreme Court in New York Tel. Co. v. New
York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979), noted that almost all labor decisions which
discuss the preemption of state action concern state regulation that section 7 protects or
section 8 prohibits. Id. at 529.
Section 8 states in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
12071984]
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join and form labor organizations, to bargain collectively, and to
engage in other concerted activities to further these rights.13 Sec-
tion 8(a) declares that an employer commits an unfair labor prac-
tice if he interferes with his employees' section 7 rights or refuses
to bargain collectively with the employees' representative. 14 The
NLRB has the authority to prevent any person from engaging in a
section 8 unfair labor practice.1 5 In the early preemption cases the
Supreme Court strictly interpreted sections 7 and 816 and permit-
ted states to retain jurisdiction only when the NLRA clearly did
not regulate the conduct in question.1 7
In Garner v. Teamsters Local 77618 the Supreme Court devel-
oped a two-pronged preemption test to determine when the NLRA
preempts state regulation of labor activities. Garner concerned
union picketing to encourage nonunion employees of a trucking op-
erator to join the union. A state court issued an injunction to stop
the picketing.1 In overruling the state court injunction, the Su-
preme Court gave two reasons for preempting state regulation.
First, the Court stated that the NLRA preempts state action
whenever the activity falls within the unfair labor practice jurisdic-
tion of the NLRA.20 The Court expressed concern that if the Board
did not retain primary jurisdiction over unfair labor practices,
guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor or-
ganization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules
and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 156 of this title,
an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him
during working hours without loss of time or pay;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation ....
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). One commentator characterized section 7 as the basic prin-
ciple of the NLRA. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 1 (1976).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (section 7 preempted
licensing provision in state law because provision interfered with employees' freedom to bar-
gain collectively).
17. See, e.g., Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315
U.S. 740 (1942) (NLRA does not preempt the states from regulating picketing or disorders
arising out of labor disputes).
18. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
19. Id. at 486-87.
20. Id. at 490.
1208
NLRA AND REPLACEMENT WORKER
state and federal courts might provide different remedies for the
same conduct.2 '1 Only exclusive Board jurisdiction ensures the uni-
formity in procedure and remedy that Congress intended the
NLRA to provide.22 Second, the Court found that the NLRA
preempts state action whenever Congress meant to leave the labor
activity unregulated.23 Subsequent decisions have refined the Gar-
ner two-pronged preemption test.24 These decisions have become
the foundation of the present labor preemption doctrine. This sec-
tion of the Recent Development discusses the two prongs of the
preemption test and the relevant case law.
1. The NLRB's Primary Jurisdiction: Conduct that the NLRA
Protects or Prohibits
In San Diego Building Trades Council Local 2020 v. Gar-
mon, 5 a landmark preemption case, 6 the Supreme Court estab-
lished specific guidelines for determining when a state must yield
its jurisdiction to the NLRB. In Garmon the labor unions picketed
the employer's business and exerted pressure on customers and
suppliers to cease doing business with the employer because the
employer refused to sign an agreement with several labor unions.27
A lower court found that the picketing constituted an unfair labor
practice under state law and awarded damages to the employer.2
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision and held
21. Id. at 498-99. The Court stated that "[t]he conflict lies in remedies, not rights. The
same picketing might injure both public and private rights. But when two separate remedies
are brought to bear on the same activity, a conflict is imminent." Id.; see 77 HARv. L. REv.
377, 378 (1963) (noting that courts preempt matters of remedy as well as substance to
achieve uniform application of federal labor policy).
22. 346 U.S. at 490.
23. The Garner Court stated:
[T]he policy of the national Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all
picketing .... For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free
is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare picket-
ing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.
Id. at 499-500.
24. For a critical analysis of the Garner decision, see Rose, Garner v. Teamsters: The
Supreme Court and Private Rights, 40 VA. L. Rav. 177 (1954); Recent Development, Fed-
eral Pre-emption of Peaceful Stranger Picketing, 54 COLUM. L. Rav. 997 (1954); Recent
Case, Labor Law-Pre-emptive Effect of Taft-Hartley-Scope of State Jurisdiction, 7
VAND. L. Rv. 422 (1954).
25. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
26. The concurrence called the opinion "a landmark in future 'pre-emption cases' in
the labor field ... ." Id. at 250 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 237. The unions wanted the employer to agree to retain only workers who
were members of the unions or who applied for membership. Id.
28. Id. at 237-38.
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that the NLRB, not the state, has primary jurisdiction over the
labor activity. The Garmon Court, by reaffirming the primary ju-
risdiction of the NLRB over unfair labor practices, expanded the
first prong of the Garner preemption test and ensured uniform ap-
plication of the NLRA.30
Growing dissatisfaction with Garmons' and its exceptions32
29. Id. at 244-45, 248.
30. Id. at 244-45; see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
31. Both members of the Court and commentators have criticized the "arguably pro-
tected and prohibited" rule of Garmon. For example, Justice White declared in Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Adriadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), that "only
labor activity determined to be actually, rather than arguably, protected under federal law
should be immune from state judicial control. To this extent [Garmon] . . . should be re-
considered." Id. at 202 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see Benke, The Apparent
Reformulation of Garmon: Its Effects on the Federal Preemption of Concerted Trespassory
Union Activity, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 793, 798-800 (1978) (discussing cases which criticize the
Garmon rule); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972) (argu-
ing that the Garmon rule is both too broad and too narrow).
Despite this criticism, the Supreme Court affirmed Garmon in Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). Lockridge raised the issue whether the
NLRA preempted a union member's state cause of action against his union for an allegedly
wrongful discharge. Id. at 277. The Supreme Court held that under Garmon wrongful dis-
charge falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. at 292. In what one commen-
tator termed a "defense of the [Garmon] test," Benke, supra, at 800, the majority reasoned
that the desire for a uniform labor policy, 403 U.S. at 286-88, the need for a rule that lower
courts could apply easily, and the need for judicial uniformity between conduct the Act
protects and conduct the Act prohibits, id. at 290, mandate that the Court apply the Gar-
mon rule. The Court recognized that the rule was not perfect, but held that without a better
preemption theory, stare decisis and deference to the legislative role of Congress in defining
federal preemption require that the Court apply Garmon. Id. at 302. In a bitter dissent,
Justice White declared that "the [Garmon] 'rule' of uniformity that the Court invokes today
is at best a tattered one, and at worst little more than a myth." Id. at 318 (White, J.,
dissenting).
32. In formulating the "arguably protected or arguably prohibited" standard, the Gar-
mon Court acknowledged that exceptions exist to the general rule. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-
44. Cases following Garmon have increased the number of exceptions, see, e.g., Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967), to a point where "the Garmon test can now be described
only by reference to its exceptions." Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Pre-
emption and Individual Rights, 51 Tax. L. REv. 1037, 1041 (1973). The exceptions to the
Garmon rule allow states to regulate labor activity that the Act otherwise would foreclose.
The Supreme Court typically groups the Garmon exceptions into three broad categories
in which the NLRA does not preempt state regulations. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 295-97 (1977); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297-98 (1971). The first exception arises when the activity touches
interests "deeply rooted in local feelings and responsibility." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. The
Court has not clearly defined the interests that fall within this exception, but it has devel-
oped a balancing test. The Court weighs the degree to which the conduct offsets the state's
interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens against the degree to which the
exercise of state jurisdiction will interfere with the federal scheme. The only cases that fall
within this exception involve violence. Note, State Trespass Laws Not Preempted by the
National Labor Relations Act, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 217, 226; see, e.g., International Union v.
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persuaded the Court to modify the primary jurisdiction rule. In
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters"3 the Court considered the power of a state to issue an
injunction against a union for picketing on an employer's property.
The union's trespass violated state law, but the NLRA arguably
protected the activity.34 The Court determined that the NLRA
does not preempt the states from enjoining all conduct that the
NLRA arguably protects and which, therefore, is under the pri-
mary jurisdiction of the NLRB . 5 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court expanded the traditional method of analyzing preemption
issues under Garmon.
The Court first examined Garmon's arguably prohibited
strand. The Court believed that the critical inquiry should be
Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (NLRA does not preempt employee's action against union for
malicious interference); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (NLRA does not
prevent state court from issuing injunction to potentially violent picketers); United Auto.,
Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Bd., 351 U.S.
266 (1956) (state has power to enjoin violent union conduct during a strike even though it
constitutes an unfair labor practice); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656 (1954) (NLRA does not grant NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over common-law
tort actions); see also Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 144, 383 U.S. 53
(1966) (malicious libel). The Garmon Court explained that, "[s]tate jurisdiction has pre-
vailed in these situations because the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federal-
ism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly ex-
pressed congressional direction." 359 U.S. at 247.
The second exception to the Garmon rule arises when the activity is only of peripheral
concern to the NLRA or would not frustrate the purposes of the Act. Id. at 243. States have
regulated the expulsion of union members under this exception. See, e.g., International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). But see Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). In Lockridge the Court held that the NLRA
preempted a cause of action by a union member for wrongful discharge under the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 297. The action in Lochridge fell under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. The Court distinguished Gonzales because Gonzales con-
cerned only internal union matters. Id. at 296.
The third exception to the Garmon rule arises when Congress provides that the states
should have the power to regulate the activity. Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 297. These provisions
include: Section 10(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976), which authorizes the NLRB to
relinquish its jurisdiction to the states under certain circumstances; § 14(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(b) (1976), which grants states the power to prohibit agreements requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment; § 14(c), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976),
which empowers states to assume jurisdiction if the NLRB declines to assert jurisdiction;
and § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976), which grants federal and state courts concurrent jurisdic-
tion over actions resulting from a secondary activity that is an unfair labor practice. For a
thorough discussion of the exceptions to the Garmon rule, see Hooton, The Exceptional
Garmon Doctrine, 26 LAB. L.J. 49, 49-65 (1975).
33. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
34. Id. at 182.
35. Id. at 207.
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whether the controversy before the state court would be identical
to or different from the controversy that the plaintiff could bring
before the NLRB. A risk of interference with the unfair labor prac-
tice jurisdiction of the Board exists only when the state court and
the NLRB hear identical controversies.3 6 Turning to the arguably
protected strand of Garmon, the Court noted that the NLRB's pri-
mary jurisdiction does not extend to cases in which an employer
has no means of invoking Board jurisdiction and the union, which
could invoke Board jurisdiction, refuses to do so. 7 The Court held,
however, that the NLRA preempts a state cause of action only
when a significant risk exists that the state court will misinterpret
federal law and protect prohibited activities. 38
Applying the new interpretation of the Garmon rule, the Sears
Court held that the NLRA did not preempt the state action, even
though section 7 arguably protects union picketing,3 9 because the
controversy in the state court would not be identical to the contro-
versy before the Board.40 In addition, the only way for the em-
ployer to determine whether the union had a federal right to re-
main on the property was by proceeding in state court."
Significantly, in Sears the Court first sanctioned state regulation of
a section 7 right and thereby impeded the intent in Garmon to
ensure uniformity through complete deference to the Board's pri-
mary jurisdiction.' 2 After Sears some commentators questioned
the continued validity of the Garmon rule,'4 but most conmenta-
36. Id. at 198.
37. Id. at 202-03.
38. Id. at 203.
39. Id. at 207. The dissent noted that § 7 "declares that 'concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,' including specific types
and forms of picketing, are protected from interference from any source." Id. at 217 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
40. The state action in Sears only challenged the location of the picketing, while the
issue before the NLRB would be the object of the picketing. The NLRB's determination
would have extended beyond the question of whether a trespass occurred. Id. at 198.
41. The plaintiff in Sears could not obtain a ruling from the Board on whether the
NLRA protected the union trespass. Only if the union filed unfair labor practice charges
against the defendant for interfering with the union's § 7 right to picket would the NLRB
have jurisdiction. The defendant only could find out whether the union had a federal right
to remain on the property by proceeding in state court. Id. at 201-02.
42. See Note, supra note 32, at 236. The dissent in Sears reiterated the need for a
uniform rule. The dissent feared that the lower courts would apply Sears improperly and
erode the "goal of a uniform administration of the national labor laws." 436 U.S. at 234
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., Comment, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters: Garmon Reconsidered and the Reaffirmation of Property Rights, 13 U. RICH. L.
REV. 351, 352 (1979); see also Note, supra note 32, at 241.
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tors agreed that Sears established a "narrow exception to the still
vital Garmon test,"44 which the Supreme Court "created in re-
sponse to a rather limited set of circumstances: when a wronged
party is left without a forum to provide a remedy." '4
2. Permitted Activities: Conduct that the NLRA
Does Not Regulate
The second prong of preemption analysis embodies the
Court's recognition that Congress intended "the free play of eco-
nomic forces" to regulate some labor activities."' State regulation
of these activities impinges on federal labor policy by interfering
with economic weapons Congress intended labor and management
to retain under the NLRA.4  For example, in Local 20, Teamsters
v. Morton" an employer sued a union representing striking em-
ployees. The employer alleged that the union had violated federal
labor law and state common law by persuading some of the em-
ployer's customers to cease doing business with the employer. 9
The district court awarded damages to the employer under state
law,50 but the Supreme Court affirmed only the portion of the
award covering union conduct that violated the Act.5 1 The Court
noted that the Act specifies the kinds of union activity during a
strike that gives an employer the right to collect damages.52 The
Morton Court believed that Congress intended to maintain a bal-
ance of power between labor and management" by leaving some
activities unregulated as an economic weapon for the unions.4 Al-
44. Note, Union Trespass, supra note 2, at 794; see Benke, supra note 31, at 815.
45. Id.
46. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971). In New York TeL Co. v. New
York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979), Justice Powell declared, "What Congress
left unregulated is as important as the regulations that it imposed." Id. at 552 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953).
48. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
49. Id. at 253-54.
50. Id. at 255. The district court award included: (1) business losses for violating § 303
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976), by encouraging employees
of an employer's customer to force their employer to cease doing business with the striking
union's employer; (2) damages for violating state law by pers-uading management of another
customer to cease doing business with the employer; and (3) damages for loss of contract
and punitive damages. 377 U.S. at 255.
51. The Supreme Court affirmed the $1600 damage award for the union's violation of
} 303. Id. at 256.
52. Id. at 258.
53. Id. at 259.
54. See id. at 260. The Court noted that the Act did not prohibit the union from
12131984]
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lowing state courts to award damages under state law for union
activity which federal law did not prohibit would upset the balance
of power between labor and management and "frustrate the con-
gressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help
available. '55
In Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis-
sion"' the Court continued to refine its preemption analysis by fo-
cusing on the union's economic weapons. In Machinists union
members refused to work overtime in an attempt to pressure an
employer during renewal negotiations for an expired collective bar-
gaining agreement.57 The employer filed unfair labor practice
charges with a state commission."' The commission held that the
union's activities violated state law 9 and ordered the union to stop
encouraging employees to refuse overtime work.60 The Supreme
Court reversed the state court decision. The Court determined that
the employer had invoked state law only because he lacked suffi-
cient economic strength to bargain successfully with the union."1
The Court noted that Congress intended employers and unions to
use economic weapons during collective bargaining. For the states
to balance the bargaining positions of the parties by regulating the
economic weapons that the parties could use, in the Court's view,
would defeat Congress' purpose in providing self-help measures for
labor and management.6 2 The Court, therefore, concluded that the
requesting that the management of an employer's customer cease doing business with the
employer. Id.
55. Id. at 260. The district court could not award punitive damages under the NLRA,
however, because § 303 limited recovery to compensatory damages. The breach of contract
claim also would not lie under § 303. Id. at 260-62.
56. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
57. Id. at 133-34.
58. The employer filed charges with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis-
sion. The employer also filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB, but the Board
dismissed them because the union "'policy prohibiting overtime work by its member em-
ployees ... does not appear to be in violation of the Act.'" Id. at 135.
59. Id. at 135-36. Wisconsin law provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employe individually or in concert with
others:
(h) To take unauthorized possession of property of the employer or to engage in
any concerted effort to interfere with production except by leaving the premises in an
orderly manner for the purpose of going on strike.
Wis. STAT. § 111.06(2) (1974).
60. 427 U.S. at 136.
61. See id. at 148-49.
62. Id. at 149. The Court stated that both the NLRB and the states "are without
[Vol. 37:12051214
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state could not prevent the union from encouraging employees to
refuse to work overtime.63
B. The Employer's Right to Hire Permanent Replacement
Workers
While the employee's right to strike" is his fundamental eco-
nomic weapon in a labor dispute, 5 an employer has an equally
powerful weapon: he may hire permanent replacement workers to
continue his business during an economic strike.6 The right to hire
replacements, however, does not exist in an unfair labor practice
strike. The NLRB, therefore, must differentiate between the two
types of strikes.6 7 In an economic strike an employee attempts to
obtain economic concessions from his employer, such as higher
wages, improved working conditions, or union recognition." An un-
fair labor practice strike occurs when an employer prevents an em-
ployee from joining or forming a labor organization or bargaining
authority to attempt to 'introduce some standard of properly "balanced" bargaining power,'
. .. or to define 'what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an
"ideal" or "balanced" state of collective bargaining."' Id. at 149-50 (quoting NLRB v. In-
surance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 497, 500 (1960)).
63. Id. at 155. This decision overruled UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employee Rela-
tions Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949), which permitted states to regulate partial strike activities
like the one in Machinists. 427 U.S. at 151, 155. The dissent in Machinists found that Con-
gress intended to regulate partial strike activity and argued that the Court should have
followed precedent and allowed the state to regulate the strike. Id. at 157-59 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
64. Section 13 of the NLRA provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifi-
cally provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that
right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976).
65. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672-73 & n.8
(1951); see also Stewart, Conversion of Strikes: Economic to Unfair Labor Practice, 45 VA.
L. REv. 1322, 1322 (1959) ("The test of any union's strength is its ability to call and conduct
a strike that forces the employer to meet its demands .... As the work stoppage is the
union's ultimate force, an employer's resilience and ability to resist strike power marks his
labor strength.").
66. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). Courts since Mackay
have continued to recognize this right. See, e.g., People v. Federal Tool and Plastics, 62 Il.
2d 549, 554, 344 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1975) ("An employer has a right to hire replacements for
striking employees and that right constitutes an important economic weapon left to the
employer by Congress when it struck the balance of power between labor and management."
(citations omitted)); see also, Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1203 (1967) (characterizing the
ability to hire replacements during a strike as "[p]ossibly the most significant permissible
response" an employer can make to a strike).
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976); R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 339.
68. See R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 339.
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collectively. 9 An employer may convert an economic strike into an
unfair labor practice strike by committing an unfair labor practice
which prolongs,70 aggravates,7 1 or expands the strike to include a
protest over the unfair labor practice.7 2 The way the NLRB char-
acterizes a strike has important ramifications on an employer's
ability to hire permanent replacement workers and on the rights of
the replacement workers and the striking employees.
1. Economic Strikes
Under the NLRA an economic striker remains an employee
until he obtains "other regular and substantially equivalent em-
ployment. 73 In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telephone Co.,7' how-
ever, the Court held that an economic striker does not have an
absolute right to reinstatement at the end of a strike. 5 In Mackay
workers struck over an employer's failure to execute agreements
concerning the terms and conditions of the workers' employment.
After the strike the employer did not rehire several of the strik-
ers.7 6 The Court found that the employer had not committed an
unfair labor practice by hiring replacement workers or by telling
the replacements that their jobs might be permanent.7 Although
the NLRA provides that nothing in the Act may interfere with the
right to strike, 8 the Court refused to find that an employer loses
the right to replace strikers to "protect and continue his busi-
ness. 7 9 The employer, the Court concluded, has no duty to rehire
69. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976), reprinted in part, supra note 12, for a list of
what constitutes an unfair labor practice.
70. See NLRB v. Windham Community Memorial Hoasp., 577 F.2d 805, 814 (2d Cir.
1978).
71. Id.
72. NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1979); see also, Stewart, supra
note 65, at 1327-28.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). The NLRA provides: "The term 'employee' . . . shall
include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute." Id.
74. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
75. The general rule is that the employer must reinstate the economic striker after the
strike is over. See, e.g,. NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equip. Co., 626 F.2d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 1980).
A striker may forfeit this right by acting violently during a strike or by using unlawful
tactics in striking for a protected object. Hirsch, Laidlaw-The Mackay Legacy, 4 GA. L.
Rav. 808, 810-11 (1970).
76. 304 U.S. at 336-39.
77. Id. at 345-46.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976).
79. 304 U.S. at 345.
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strikers that he has replaced.80
Mackay laid the foundation for the Court's future pronounce-
ments on economic strikes.81 For example, the Court affirmed Mac-
80. Id. at 346.
81. Commentators have criticized Mackay on several fronts. Mackay curtails a right
that the NLRA explicitly grants to employees-the right to strike. See 29 U.S.C. § 163
(1976). Commentators list two adverse effects of hiring permanent replacement workers dur-
ing a strike. First, allowing management to continue operations weakens the strikers' bar-
gaining position. Second, the replacement workers undermine the union's status as the
workers' bargaining representative. Replacement workers are likely to be antiunion and may
vote in certification elections during a strike. Comment, Replacement of Workers During
Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 634 (1966). See also Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the
Myth of Business Necessity, 50 Tax. L. Rav. 782, 783 (1972).
Another criticism of Mackay is that hiring permanent replacement workers confuses
the legal rights of the employer, the employee, and the replacement workers during and
after a strike. Often the Board or the courts do not determine the nature of a strike until
years after the strike ends. This potential delay hinders the strike settlement process. See
Comment, supra, at 640; see also Gillespie, supra, at 785. An employer who hires permanent
replacement workers will characterize the strike as an economic strike to maximize his bar-
gaining power and give him the option to dismiss both the striking union members and their
union. See Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misno-
mer-"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 Tax. L. Rav. 378, 384 (1969); see also Gillespie,
supra, at 786. On the other hand, if the court classifies the strike as an unfair labor practice
strike, the employer is subject to backpay sanctions from the day the striking employees
request reinstatement.
Employees will argue that they are striking against an unfair labor practice to ensure
them an absolute right to reinstatement. Employees striking against what they believe is an
unfair labor practice, but what a court later characterizes as an economic injustice, lose their
jobs if the employer hired permanent replacements. See Schatzki, supra, at 387-88; see also
Gillespie, supra, at 785. Some commentators believe that abolishing the Mackay doctrine in
favor of a rule that allows the employer to hire temporary replacements is the only way to
ensure uniform treatment of strikes. See, e.g., Comment, supra, at 640-41.
An alternative view to abolishing the fackay doctrine is to require the employer to
prove that he had no choice but to hire permanent replacement workers. See Gillespie,
supra, at 791-95 (listing factors a court should consider in determining whether the em-
ployer acted soundly); see also Janes, The Illusion of Permanency for Mackay Doctrine
Replacement Workers, 54 Tax. L. Rav. 126, 150 (1975). Commentators have questioned the
basic principle of Mackay, that an employer can do business only by offering permanent
employment to replacement workers. See Schatzki, supra, at 385. But see Unkovic & Harty,
Management's Legal Problems in Continuing Plant Operations During an Economic Strike
Under Federal and Pennsylvania Law, 67 DICK. L. Rav. 63 (1962) (arguing that using tem-
porary replacement workers is economically efficient).
Commentators believe that the Mackay doctrine is unnecessary because the employer
can hire temporary replacement workers, see Schatzki, supra, at 392, or use other alterna-
tives to combat the strike. For example, the employer could try shutdowns, reductions in
the labor force, lockouts, strike insurance, and arbitration. See Gillespie, supra, at 790-91.
In some prounion communities, however, where little unemployment exists and the citizenry
is hostile to strikebreakers, the employer may not be able to hire permanent replacement
workers. Id. In that situation, the employer would have to demonstrate a legitimate and
substantial business justification for hiring permanent replacements. Id. at 796-97. Certain
seasonal occupations, for example, may justify the need to hire permanent workers. Id. at
795.
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kay in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co. 82 The Court stated that un-
less an employer can show "legitimate and substantial business
justifications"83 for refusing to reinstate strikers, the employer is
guilty of an unfair labor practice."4 The Court specified that an
employer has a business justification when he hires permanent re-
placement workers to continue his business operations.8 " Because
the employer in Fleetwood Trailer failed to show a legitimate and
substantial business justification for hiring new employees after
the strike ended and refused to reinstate the economic strikers, the
Court found that the employer had committed an unfair labor
practice.86
82. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
83. Id. at 378. The Court formulated this standard in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). When an employer's conduct is inherently destructive of impor-
tant employee rights, the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer in-
troduces evidence that business considerations motivated the conduct. If, however, the ef-
fect on the employees' rights is comparatively slight, and the employer produces evidence of
a legitimate and substantial business justification for his conduct, the employees must prove
antiunion motivation to sustain an unfair labor practice charge.
84. The employer would violate 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1976).
85. Fleetwood Trailer, 389 U.S. at 379.
86. Id. at 380-81. The Court concluded that employees lose the right to reinstatement
when openings are not available at the time that the employees request reinstatement. In
Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970), the
court used Fleetwood Trailer to conclude that a legitimate and substantial business justifi-
cation does not exist when an employer refuses to reinstate economic strikers after replace-
ment workers leave their jobs following a strike. Id. at 105. See Comment, Preferential Hir-
ing Rights of Economic Strikers, 73 DICK. L. REv. 322, 336 (1969) (arguing that in retaining
the employer's right to hire permanent replacement workers, Laidlaw balances the needs of
the employer and the employee). Before Laidlaw the NLRB's position had been that if the
employer has filled the striker's position with a permanent employee, the employer had no
obligation to the striker, except to treat him as a new job applicant. See, e.g., Brown & Root,
Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 486, enforced, 311 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1963).
Other circuit courts have followed Laidlaw. See, e.g., Little Rock Airmotive, Inc. v.
NLRB, 455 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Hartmann Luggage Co., 453 F.2d 178 (6th
Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Johnson Sheet Metal, Inc., 442 F.2d 1056, 1061 (10th Cir. 1971); Ameri-
can Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1970). Laidlaw and its progeny raise
questions about the extent of an employer's obligation to rehire economic strikers when
positions become available. For example, for how long does the economic striker have a right
to reinstatement? What standard should a court use to determine whether a permanently
replaced economic striker obtained regular or substantially equivalent employment? What
steps must an employer undertake to locate economic strikers when vacancies arise? What
qualifies as a legitimate and substantial business justification? See Farmer, Issues and Prac-
tical Problems Caused by Fleetwood Trailer and Laidlaw Mfg., 4 GA. L. Rv. 802, 806-07
(1970); Hirsh, supra note 75, at 825-28.
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2. Unfair Labor Practice Strikes
Like economic strikers, unfair labor practice strikers remain
employees under the NLRA.87 Unfair labor practice strikers, how-
ever, possess an absolute right to reinstatement. In Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB,88 for example, the employer wanted one union to
represent his employees and threatened to release employees who
supported a rival union. A strike resulted when the employer dis-
charged an employee who actively supported the disfavored
union." Finding that the employer had engaged in an unfair labor
practice, the Court held that the employer had to reinstate the
strikers with backpay, even if he had hired replacements.90 In ad-
dition, if an employer abolishes the jobs of unfair labor practice
strikers, even for legitimate business reasons, he must rehire the
strikers when new jobs become available.' 1
3. Converted Strikes
Although the Supreme Court has not considered an employer's
right to hire and retain permanent replacement workers in a strike
that begins as an economic strike and becomes an unfair labor
practice strike, both the Board and lower federal courts have ad-
dressed the issue. In NLRB v. Top Manufacturing Co., Inc.2" an
employer refused to reinstate striking employees after they offered
to return to work. The employees struck when the employer ceased
to recognize the union. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's decision that the employer's
conduct constituted an unfair labor practice. The strikers, there-
fore, had the right to return to their jobs.' The court noted that
when an economic strike becomes an unfair labor practice strike,
the strikers become unfair labor practice strikers and the employer
must reinstate the strikers unless he permanently replaced them
before the status of the strike changed. The Board has adopted a
similar position."
87. The Act provides: "The term 'employee' shall include... any individual whose
work has ceased ... because of any unfair practice .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
88. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
89. Id. at 273.
90. Id. at 278. See also NLRB v. Laredo Coca Cola Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 1338 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 889 (1980) (finding of unfair labor practice entitled strikers to
an unconditional right to reinstatement).
91. Stewart, supra note 65, at 1326.
92. 594 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1979).
93. Id. at 224.
94. Id. at 225. For example, in R.J. Oil & Ref. Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 641 (1954), the Board
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III. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale
Although Supreme Court decisions have clarified the rights
that strikers possess under the NLRA, the Court had not ad-
dressed the rights of discharged permanent replacement workers.
In Belknap, Inc. v. Hale5 the Court confronted the issue whether
the NLRA permitted discharged permanent replacement workers
to bring an action against their former employer in state court. In
Belknap approximately 400 employees struck because the em-
ployer and the employees' union failed to reach a new contract
agreement. The day the strike began the employer granted wage
increases to union employees who remained on the job.98 The em-
ployer then hired permanent replacement workers to fill the posi-
tions that the strikers vacated. During the strike the union filed
unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB because of the wage
increases, and the employer countered with charges against the
union. Meanwhile, the employer continued to assure the replace-
ment workers that their positions were permanent.9
The NLRB filed a complaint against the employer on the
ground that the wage increases constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice." ' In an effort to resolve the dispute, the employer discharged
the replacement workers and rehired the striking employees.100
Twelve of the discharged replacement workers then sued the em-
ployer for misrepresentation and breach of contract.101 The com-
held that it would not require an employer to reinstate employees that he permanently
replaced during an economic strike. Once the strike becomes an unfair labor practice strike,
however, the employer must reinstate all employees that he fired after the conversion. Id. at
648; see also NLRB v. Guistina Bros. Lumber Co., 253 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1958) (employer
must reinstate strikers when economic strike becomes an unfair labor practice strike and the
employer has not hired replacement workers).
95. 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983).
96. Id. at 3174.
97. A portion of the employer's advertisement for replacement workers read:
PERMANENT EMPLOYEES WANTED.... OPENINGS AVAILABLE FOR
QUALIFIED PERSONS LOOKING FOR EMPLOYMENT TO PERMANENTLY
REPLACE STRIKING WAREHOUSE AND MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES.
Id. at 3174 n.1.
98. Id. at 3175. In a letter to the replacement workers, the employer stated: "You will
continue to be permanent employees so long as you conduct yourself in accordance with the
policies and practices that are in effect here at Belknap." Id.
99. The NLRB alleged that the wage increases violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1),
158(a)(3), and 158(a)(5) (1976). Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3175.
100. Belknap, 103 S.Ct. at 3175-76.
101. The replacement workers' employment contract included the provision, "I ...
have been employed by Belknap, Inc .... as a regular full time permanent replace-
ment. . ." Id. at 3175.
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plaint alleged that the employer hired the replacement workers
knowing that their positions were not permanent and knowing that
the replacement workers would rely on the offers of permanent
employment. In addition, the complaint stated that by discharging
the replacement workers, the employer breached their employment
contracts. 102  Each replacement worker claimed $500,000 in
damages.10 3
The Supreme Court first examined the employer's contention
that the Morton-Machinists line of analysis should leave the con-
duct of the parties unregulated.'" The employer argued that regu-
lation would impair one of his primary economic weapons during a
strike-the right to hire permanent replacement workers. Further-
more, the employer asserted that subjecting him to damages in
state court for reinstating striking employees would interfere with
the settlement of strikes.05 The Court rejected these arguments by
distinguishing the congressional intent to allow employers and un-
ions to use economic weapons against each other, which the Court
recognized in Morton and Machinists, from a situation in which
the unregulated use of economic weapons injures innocent third
parties.10 6 The Court refused to believe that Congress intended to
promote the lawless use of economic weapons.10 7
The Court determined that awarding damages to discharged
replacement workers would not affect an employer's economic po-
sition.10 8 The Court believed that employers could insulate them-
selves from liability by making their offers for permanent employ-
ment conditional. Under a conditional contract, employment would
be permanent absent a strike settlement requiring the employer to
rehire the strikers or a finding that the strike was an unfair labor
102. Id. at 3176.
103. The employees sought $250,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in puni-
tive damages. Id. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the NLRA preempted the state cause of action. Id. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals reversed on two grounds and held that the NLRA did not apply. First, preemption
was inappropriate because the employer did not commit an unfair labor practice. Second,
the contract and misrepresentation claims were only of peripheral concern to the NLRA,
but they were important matters of local law. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted
discretionary review, but later vacated its order. The United States Supreme Court then
granted certiorari to hear the case. Id.
104. For a discussion of Morton and Machinists, see supra notes 48-63 and accompa-
nying text.
105. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3177.
106. Id. at 3178.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3177.
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practice strike.109 In suggesting that employers make replacement
contracts conditional, the Court altered the traditional perception
of permanent replacement workers by stating that replacements
who employers hire under conditional contracts would satisfy the
Mackay permanency requirement.110 The employer, then, would
not be liable for discharging the replacement workers during or af-
ter an economic strike if he refused to reinstate the strikers.
The Court then turned to the replacement workers' misrepre-
sentation and breach of contract claims. The Court first refuted
the employer's argument that primary jurisdiction under Garmon
preempted the misrepresentation claim because it related to con-
duct that was arguably an unfair labor practice.' According to the
Court, Sears dictated that conduct which the NLRA arguably pro-
hibits only falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB when
the issue before the state court would be identical to the issue
before the Board.112 The majority concluded, however, that the
Board and the state court would address different issues in Belk-
nap. The Board would focus on the rights of the strikers, while the
state court would determine whether the employer deceived the re-
placement workers by executing contracts for permanent employ-
ment.113 The Court felt that although the misrepresentation action
was only of peripheral concern to the Board, the state had a sub-
stantial interest in protecting its citizens from misrepresentations.
The NLRA, therefore, did not preempt the misrepresentation
claim.1 14
In upholding the replacement workers' breach of contract
claim, the Court noted that federal law does not give an employer
the right to discharge replacement workers by breaching promises
of permanent employment. Even if the employer discharges re-
placement workers pursuant to a Board order forcing him to rein-
state strikers after a finding of an unfair labor practice, the NLRA
does not preempt the replacement workers' breach of contract
claim.11 5 The Court viewed the interests of the Board and the
NLRA as different from the state's interest in providing a remedy
109. Id. at 3179-80.
110. Id. at 3178-79. See supra text accompanying notes 74-82 (discussion of Mackay).
111. 103 S. Ct. at 3183. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Garmon.
112. See supra text accompanying note 36.
113. 103 S. Ct. at 3183.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 3184.
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for a breach of contract claim. 116 The Court concluded that absent
a conflict between the state's interest and the rights of the strikers
or the employer, the replacement workers' breach of contract claim
would not frustrate national labor policy.11
The dissent118 concluded that the NLRA preempted the re-
placement workers' claims because they went to the core of federal
labor policy." 9 The dissent argued that Garmon should preempt
the breach of contract claim because of the potential for conflict
between the NLRA and state law. Under the NLRA, the employer
must reinstate strikers by discharging their replacements, even
though the discharge breaches the replacement workers' employ-
ment contracts. The dissent found this conflict intolerable.12 0 The
dissent pointed out that allowing breach of contract claims also
would make an employer less willing to rehire striking employees.
The employer more likely would litigate an unfair labor practice
claim than settle it, which would frustrate the federal interest in
ending strikes and settling labor disputes.12 1
The dissent also argued that Machinists should preempt the
misrepresentation claim. 2 The dissent contended that the major-
ity's new definition of permanent replacements upsets the delicate
balance between labor and management.12 3 After Belknap an em-
ployer might decide not to hire permanent replacement workers or
116. Id.
117. Id. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. He recognized the important
economic weapon that an employer possesses in having the ability to hire permanent re-
placement workers, but he felt that the courts should not regulate promises of permanent
employment. Id. at 3187. Blackmun, therefore, agreed with the majority that the NLRA did
not preempt the replacement workers' state claims, but he disagreed with the majority's
concept of a conditional offer of employment. Blackmun felt that the majority approach did
not give proper deference to the Board's traditional definition of permanent replacements as
workers who "'were regarded by themselves and the [employer] as having received their
jobs on a permanent basis.' "Id. at 3184 (quoting the Court at 3178 (quoting Georgia High-
way Express, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 514, 516 (1967), afi'd sub nom., Truck Drivers and Helpers
Local 728 v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968))). In addi-
tion, Blackmun believed that an employer making a conditional promise of permanent em-
ployment has almost no legitimate and substantial business justification for refusing to rein-
state striking employees. Id. at 3187. Blackmun would have held that the federal
government should regulate promises of permanent employment. This approach, according
to Blackmun, would provide consistency in federal labor law. Id. at 3189.
118. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall and
Powell joined.
119. Id. at 3190 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 3193 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 3194 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 3196 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 3197 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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only to hire them when the strike is clearly for economic reasons,
because the employer may risk future liability if he discharges the
replacements. According to the dissent, state law could inhibit the
full use of an economic weapon that is available under federal
law."" The dissent, therefore, would have held that the NLRA pre-
empted the replacement workers' misrepresentation and breach of
contract claims.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF Belknap
A. Federal Preemption
Belknap is the Supreme Court's most recent attempt to artic-
ulate the appropriate boundaries of state labor regulation under
the NLRA. Instead of clarifying the preemption issue, however, the
decision merely illustrates the inefficiency of the Court's present
method of analyzing labor preemption questions. First, the Court
continues to acknowledge the Garmon rule as the starting point for
its preemption analysis, despite the numerous exceptions that have
diminished the rule's effectiveness.2 5 Second, in failing to identify
legitimate economic weapons in the Morton-Machinists line of
preemption analysis, the Court continues to foster uncertainty. 126
The Supreme Court in Belknap had the opportunity to estab-
lish a more workable preemption doctrine, yet failed to take any
action. Belknap, however, does illustrate the Court's willingness to
rely on the Sears analysis. 7 By recognizing Sears as the appropri-
ate foundation for a preemption doctrine and eliminating the Gar-
mon rule, the Court could have formulated a clearer preemption
doctrine and eliminated the Morton-Machinists line of analysis.
Under the Sears approach, the NLRA would preempt a state cause
of action for any activity which the NLRA clearly protects or pro-
124. Id. at 3197 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See supra note 32; see also Recent Development, Labor Law-
Preemption-State Court May Exercise Jurisdiction to Restrain Peaceful Union Trespass
Both Arguably Protected and Arguably Prohibited by National Labor Relations Act: Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 64 CORNELL L. REv., 595,
608 (1979). The author notes that state courts easily applied the original Garmon rule, and
the rule's broad coverage made "erroneous state-court assumption of jurisdiction unlikely."
Id. The many exceptions to the Garmon rule that courts later established, however, made it
increasingly difficult to apply. State courts must now review all the rule's exceptions before
deciding to apply the rule. See Hooton, supra note 32, at 63-65 (discussing the effects of the
Garmon rule exceptions).
126. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text for an analysis of Morton and
Machinists.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
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hibits. This approach is consistent with Congress' purpose in en-
acting the NLRA.128 In all other cases the NLRA would preempt
state action in only two circumstances. First, the NLRA would pre-
empt a state cause of action when the controversies before the
state court and the Board were identical. This rule would not ap-
ply, however, if a party could not invoke the Board's jurisdiction
and the party's adversary refused to do so.129 Second, the NLRA
would preempt a state cause of action when a risk existed that
state courts could interfere seriously with national labor policy.13 0
This approach eliminates the inherent uncertainties confronting
courts that must determine whether a labor activity arguably falls
within the penumbral area of the NLRA or under a Garmon ex-
ception to the Act.
B. Hiring Permanent Replacement Workers
Despite widespread criticism of the Mackay doctrine," 1 the
Belknap Court affirmed the right of an employer to hire perma-
nent replacement workers. The limitations that Belknap imposes
on the exercise of this right, however, may make the Mackay doc-
trine impossible for employers to apply. Before Belknap, Mackay
gave employers an unqualified right to hire permanent replace-
ment workers to continue business operations if the employer
could demonstrate a legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tion.132 The Belknap Court never suggested that an employer was
liable for discharging replacement workers as part of a strike set-
tlement or in compliance with an NLRB order if the strike con-
cerned an unfair labor practice. The Court, however, did alter the
Mackay doctrine by specifically granting replacement workers a
state cause of action against their employer. After Belknap, Mac-
kay remains a viable doctrine for employers only when the employ-
ees strike for economic reasons. This approach is ineffective be-
cause the nature of a strike may change.133
128. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
130. See supra text accompanying note 38.
131. See supra note 81.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
The NLRB has the authority to issue advisory opinions on whether it has jurisdiction
over a labor dispute. The Code of Federal Regulations provides:
Whenever a party to a proceeding before any agency or court of any State or Terri-
tory is in doubt whether the Board would assert jurisdiction on the basis of its current
jurisdictional standards, he may file a petition with the Board for an advisory opinion
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The Belknap Court attempted to retain some vestiges of the
economic power that Mackay granted employers. The Court con-
cluded that conditional offers of permanent employment satisfy
the Mackay-Fleetwood permanency requirement. Under the
Court's new definition of permanency, a replacement worker is a
permanent employee unless the employer discharges the worker
because of a strike settlement or replaces him because the em-
ployer committed an unfair labor practice during the strike."" By
making the replacement workers' jobs conditional, however, Belk-
nap is detrimental to employers who are unable to hire temporary
replacement workers. Belknap's conditional employment contract
offers no more job security to a replacement worker than a tempo-
rary employment contract.
The nature of employment contracts for permanent replace-
ment undoubtedly will change because of Belknap. Few employers
will risk liability by making unconditional offers of permanent em-
ployment. For example, an employer who in good faith believes
that a strike is for economic reasons may feel compelled to make
unconditional offers of permanent employment to continue his
business. If, years later, a court determines that the strike is an
unfair labor strike, the employer is liable to the strikers for back
pay from the date they requested reinstatement. In addition,
under federal law the employer must reinstate the strikers. If the
employer cannot absorb all the strikers and replacements workers,
he may have to discharge the replacement workers. Under Belk-
nap, the employer is then liable for damages to the replacement
workers in state court.
State courts are likely to confront situations in which an em-
ployer has not made his replacement workers conditional offers of
permanent employment. The Belknap decision provides state
courts with little guidance. Instead, the Court merely enunciates a
broad rule under which a replacement worker can sue in state
on whether it would assert jurisdiction on the basis of its current standards.
29 C.F.R. § 102.98(a) (1983). For a discussion of the way to use Board opinions in labor
disputes, see Come, Preemption: The Future of Garmon, 23 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB. 89, 98-99
(1971); Hooton, supra note 32, at 64-65. A Board opinion could help the employer deter-
mine whether the Board believes that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike, and
therefore, under the Board's jurisdiction, or merely an economic strike. Advisory opinions,
however, may not be helpful to an employer. The NLRB may take too long to issue its
opinion, which may thereby injure the employer's business if he waits for the opinion before
hiring replacement workers. In addition, the nature of the strike could change after the
Board issues its opinion. See Note, supra note 32, at 240.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
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court for losing his job after receiving an offer of permanent em-
ployment. Although the Court reaches the just result, it fails to
recognize that some employers may have a legitimate need to offer
replacement workers permanent employment. The Court could
deal better with this problem by instructing state courts to assume
that a rebuttable presumption exists that the employer is liable for
damages. The employer then would bear the burden of proving his
need to hire permanent replacement workers. 3 5 State courts could
award damages in proportion to the employer's ability to bear his
burden of proof. The Belknap Court, however, assumes that em-
ployers are liable per se for offering replacement workers perma-
nent employment.
One way to understand the Belknap Court's willingness to re-
strict Mackay is to recognize Belknap as evidence of the Court's
intent to increase the rights of economic strikers who have lost
their jobs permanently. Because Mackay did not address the rights
of economic strikers, later judicial decisions attempted to resolve
this issue. For example, the Court has held that employers must
rehire economic strikers when vacancies exist at the end of a
strike." 6 The NLRB and several circuit courts have adopted the
Laidlaw doctrine, under which employers must reinstate economic
strikers when replacement workers vacate their jobs.187 Although
the Supreme Court has not affirmed Laidlaw, Belknap illustrates
the Court's desire to protect economic strikers.
The conditional employment contract that the Belknap Court
advocates 2 8 undeniably protects economic strikers. Before Belk-
nap at the conclusion of a strike an employer could choose to re-
tain replacement workers or rehire economic strikers without fear
of liability. An employer who makes a conditional employment
contract with replacement workers after Belknap has little reason
not to reinstate economic strikers because he will not be liable to
the discharged replacement workers under the terms of the em-
ployment contract. A union probably would be successful in argu-
ing that an employer's refusal to bargain with the strikers consti-
tutes an unfair labor practice because no substantial and
legitimate business justification exists for refusing to reinstate the
135. See Note, Reinstatement: Expanded Rights for Economic Strikers: Laidlaw
Corp. v. NLRB, 58 CALn. L. REv. 511, 524 (1970).
136. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
137. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
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strikers. " 9 The union could not make this argument unless the re-
placement workers had conditional contracts.
Although Belknap restricts the employer's bargaining position
under Mackay, the Court's decision is statutorily sound. In labor
preemption cases the Court has attempted to carry out the intent
of Congress.14 0 The NLRA specifically grants employees the right
to strike"" and classifies strikers as employees until they obtain
"other regular and substantially equivalent employment."1 4 2 Con-
gress, however, did not choose to grant employers the right to hire
permanent replacement workers. The Court developed this eco-
nomic weapon with the Mackay doctrine.14 3 When the Belknap
Court had to choose between protecting the exercise of a federally
granted economic right and restricting a judicial doctrine, the
Court correctly upheld the intent of Congress.
C. State Interpretations of "Permanent Employment"
The Court's failure to define permanent employment in the
context of labor contracts will result in inconsistent state interpre-
tations of Belknap. The duration of a contract for permanent em-
ployment depends entirely on the meaning that the state court as-
cribes to the term.14 4 For example, permanent employment may
mean employment for a reasonable period, employment for life,
employment for as long as the employee can perform the services,
employment for as long as the employee's services are satisfactory,
or employment for as long as employment is available. 5
Some state courts continue to follow the common-law rule that
a contract for permanent employment conveys no indication of du-
ration and, therefore, is terminable at the will of either party.14 6
139. Justice Blackmun expressed this concern in his concurrence. See supra note 117.
140. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
302, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976). See supra note 64 (text of provision).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). See supra note 73 (text of provision).
143. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
144. See Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889, 902 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
145. See id. at 902.
146. See, e.g., United Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 281 Ala. 264, 265-66, 201 So.
2d 853, 854-55 (1967); Roy Jorgensen Assoc., Inc., v. Deschenes, 409 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla.
Dist. Ct App. 1982); Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Iowa 1971);
Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874, 874-75 (Miss. 1981); Parker v. United
Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 724, 649 P.2d 181, 183 (1982); Shanholtz v. Monongahela
Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178, 182 (W. Va. 1980).
H.G. Wood formulated the common-law rule concerning terminable-at-will employ-
ment. According to Wood's Rule, "a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at
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One state court interpreting the meaning of terminable-at-will de-
clared "the employer or the employee may have a good reason, a
wrong reason, or no reason for terminating the employment con-
tract. ' 147 Many courts, however, now recognize exceptions to the
terminable at will rule, and the rule gradually has fallen into dis-
use. 148 One reason that terminable-at-will employment contracts
are less popular with the courts is that courts are reluctant to find
that the parties intended to bind themselves indefinitely. 49
Belknap will magnify the differences now existing among the
various states' labor laws. The ability of an employer to hire per-
manent replacement workers and his strength during the bargain-
will." H. WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877), quoted in Note, Implied Contract
Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 341 (1974). The Restatement also adopts this
view:
Promises by a principal to employ and by an agent to serve are interpreted as promises
to employ and to serve at the agreed rate only so long as either party wishes, if no time
is specified and no consideration for entering into the relation is given other than the
promise in general terms to employ or to serve ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 comment a (1958). Several states codified Wood's
Rule. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1971) ("An employment, having no specified
term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.").
Commentators have criticized terminable-at-will employment and have proposed sev-
eral alternatives. See, e.g., Comment, Wrongful Termination of Employees at Will: The
California Trend, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 259, 280-85 (1983) (good faith covenant in permanent
contracts); Note, supra, at 366-68 (dismissal for cause standard); Note, Protecting At Will
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HAiv. L. Rv. 1816, 1836-44 (1980) (duty to terminate only in good faith). For a defense of
Wood's Rule, see Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J.
881, 891-93 (1983) (Abolishing the rule presents employers with the prospect of litigation
and the additional costs of discharging unwanted employees.).
147. Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874, 874-75 (Miss. 1981).
148. C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 115 (1983);
see, e.g., Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y. 2d 458, 443 N.E. 2d 441, 457 N.Y.S. 2d 193
(1982) (at-will rule contains a rebuttable presumption that party can overcome); Smith v.
Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981) (seaman wrongfully discharged
after exercising statutory right to file a personal injury action against employer); Peterman
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (stat-
ute or public policy considerations may limit employer's authority to terminate at-will em-
ployee). Professor Corbin feels that a terminable-at-will contract is not a contract. 1 A.
CORBIN, CoRBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 96, at 418 (1963).
149. See, e.g., Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889, (N.D. Iowa 1961). Courts focus
on the intent of the parties and will not allow an employer to terminate a contract at will if
it contains an express or implied condition to the contrary. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc.,
24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 704, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1972). Contracts that violate public policy,
C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, supra note 148, at 116, or contain implied good faith convenants,
id. at 131, also are not terminable at will. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.
3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (discharge for refusing to commit a criminal
act violated public policy); Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981) (court found an implied promise of employment from all the circumstances, including
a good faith covenant).
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ing process will become a function of the way in which a state
court interprets the meaning of permanent employment. Thus, an
employer in a state that continues to define contracts for perma-
nent employment as terminable at will can circumvent state claims
that Belknap allows discharged replacement workers. The em-
ployer can argue in state court that he merely terminated the con-
tract at will. The replacement workers, then, cannot collect dam-
ages. The employer can afford to be flexible in settlement
negotiations. He can retain the replacement workers or rehire the
striking employees without fear of liability. Conversely, employers
in states that do not have the terminable-at-will standard are in a
much weaker bargaining position. These employers are liable for
damages if a jury determines that a contract for permanent em-
ployment existed, and that the employer prematurely terminated
the contract. An employer would be more reluctant to rehire the
strikers if their discharged replacements could sue in state court. If
the Court had defined permanent employment in the context of
replacement worker contracts, it could have avoided the inconsis-
tent state interpretations that are likely to result from Belknap.
V. CONCLUSION
Belknap highlights the need for federal legislation that defines
the rights of permanent replacement workers and the appropriate
scope of state authority under the NLRA. Congress has chosen not
to act in these areas thus far, 50 yet the potential inconsistencies
among states because of Belknap accelerate the need for congres-
sional action. Although Congress has amended the NLRA only
twice,15 precedent does exist for a congressional response to a Su-
preme Court decision in the labor area.152
150. See Note, supra note 32, at 238-39 (contending that Congress could solve pre-
emption problems by clearly defining the limitations of state power in the field of labor
relations).
151. Congress first amended the NLRA with the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. The most
significant portions of the Act characterized specific labor activities as unfair labor practices,
reinstated the labor injunction, and provided for federal court jurisdiction over suits to en-
force labor contracts. The Landrum-Griffin Act further amended the NLRA in 1959. Con-
gress passed the Act primarily to solve the problems of corruption within union leadership
and undemocratic conduct of internal union affairs. The Act required elaborate reporting by
the unions and set forth a "bill of rights" for union members. The Act also imposed addi-
tional regulations on union activities by amending the unfair labor practice provisions of the
NLRA. R. GoPamA, supra, note 13, at 5-6. See Note, Union Trespass, supra note 2, at 797.
152. See Note, Labor Law-Invoking State Trespass Laws to Enjoin Peaceful Union
Picketing, 15 WAKE FOREST L. Rv. 288, 305 (1979). In Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,
353 U.S. 1, (1957), the Supreme Court determined that state courts did not have jurisdiction
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Without congressional action, the only means of preventing in-
consistent state treatment of permanent replacement workers is
for the Court to reevaluate and clarify Belknap. First, the Court
should adopt the Sears analysis as the foundation for a new pre-
emption doctrine and eliminate the ineffective Garmon rule and
the Morton-Machinists line of analysis. Second, the Court should
provide the states with guidelines on the way to deal with an em-
ployer's need to offer replacement workers unconditional perma-
nent employment. Last, the Court should define permanent em-
ployment in the context of hiring replacement workers. In this
way, the Supreme Court will further Congress' intent in enacting
the NLRA-to provide a uniform national labor policy.
STEPHANIE LEA STROMIRE
over labor disputes simply because the Board decided not to hear them. Congress responded
by enacting § 164(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1982), which gave state courts jurisdiction
over labor disputes that the Board refused to hear.
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